This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the instantaneous allocations subject to budget constraints.
core of the average game, while the coalitions' excesses converge to an a priori given cone. And third, we establish connections to approachability theory [9] , [18] and attainability theory [4] , [19] .
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I. INTRODUCTION Coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), introduced first by Von Neuman and
Morgenstern [25] , have recently sparked much interest in the control and communication engineering communities [21] . In essence, coalitional TU games are comprised of a set of players who can form coalitions and a characteristic function associating a real number with every coalition. This real number represents the value of the coalition and can be thought of as a monetary value that can be distributed among the members of the coalition according to some appropriate fairness allocation rule. The value of a coalition also reflects the monetary benefit demanded by a coalition to be a part of the grand coalition. This paper considers a dynamic TU game, where the characteristic function is a bounded mean ergodic process. Bounded means that the characteristic function takes values in a convex set according to an unknown probability distribution. Mean ergodic means that the expected value of the coalitions values at each time coincides with the long term average. With the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game obtained by averaging over time the coalitions' values, and assume that the core of the average game is nonempty on the long run.
Given the above dynamic TU game, a central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the instantaneous allocations subject to budget constraints. Before the game starts, the central planner knows the nature of the process (bounded mean ergodic), the bounded set and the long run average coalitions' values. On the other hand, he has no knowledge of the underlying probability function generating the instantaneous coalitions' values. Our goal is to find allocation rules that use a measure of the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time by re-distributing the budget among the players.
The objective is two-fold: i) guaranteeing convergence of the average allocations to the core (or a specific point in the core) of the average game, ii) driving the coalitions' excesses to an a priori given cone. The resulting allocation rules are robust as they guarantee the aforementioned convergence properties despite the uncertain and time-varying nature of the coaltions' values.
In the context of coalitional TU games, robustness and dynamics naturally arise in all the situations where the coalitions values are uncertain and time-varying, see e.g., [7] . Robustness has to do with modeling coalitions' values as unknown entities and this is in spirit with some literature on stochastic coalitional games [23] , [24] . However, we deviate from the latter works since the probability function generating the random coalitions values is unknown, and this is more in line with the concept of Unknown But Bounded (UBB) variables formalized in [8] .
It is worth to mention that this formulation shares some common elements with the recent literature on interval valued games [1] , where the authors use intervals to describe coalitions values quite similar to what is done in this paper. The interval nature of coalitions' values arises generally due to the optimistic and pessimistic expectations of the coalitions [11] when cooperation is achieved from a strategic form game. We also note some differences in that we focus here more on the time-varying nature of the coalitions' values. In doing so, we also link the approach to the set invariance theory [10] and stochastic stability theory [20] which provides us some nice tools for stability analysis (see, e.g., the use of a Lyapunov function in the proof of Theorem 4.1).
Bringing dynamical aspects into the framework of coalitional TU games is an element in common with other papers [13] , [16] , [17] . The main difference with those works is that the values of coalitions are realized exogenously and no relation exists between consecutive samples.
Convergence conditions together with the idea that allocation rules use a measure of the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time by re-distributing the budget among the players are a main issue in a number of other papers [2] , [12] , [15] , [18] , [22] as well. However, this paper departs from the aforementioned ones mainly in that dynamics in those works is captured by a bargaining mechanism with fixed coalitions' values while we let the values be time-varying and uncertain. This last element adds some robustness to our allocation rule which has not been dealt with before.
The main contribution of this paper is captured by the following three results. First, we design an allocation rule based on full observation of the extra reward so that the average allocation approaches a specific point in the core of the average game, while the coalitions' excesses converge to an a priori given direction. Second, we design a new allocation rule based on partial observation on the extra reward so that the average allocation converges April 24, 2012 DRAFT to the core of the average game, while the coalitions' excesses converge to an a priori given cone. Convergence of both allocation rules is proved via Lyapunov stochastic stability theory. And third, we establish connections of the Lyapunov stochastic stability theory to the approachability theory [9] , [18] and attainability theory [4] , [19] .
A few other contributions of the paper are the definition of average game, whose role becomes fundamental when the coalitions' values variations are known with delay by the planner; the reformulation of the problem as a network flow control problem, where the allocation rule turns into a robust control policy is a novel aspect, with the importance of such a reformulation lying in the fact that we can prove the convergence of the allocations using the strong tools of the Lyapunov stochastic stability theory; and finally, the idea of turning a coalitional TU game set up into a control theoretic problem is a novel one, which represents, by far, the main characteristics of this work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the problem. In Section III, we present the basic idea of our solution approach. In Section IV we state the three main results of this work and postpone the derivation of such results to Section V. In Section VI, we provide some numerical illustrations. Finally, in Section VII, we draw some concluding remarks.
Notation. We view vectors as columns. For a vector x, we use x i or [x] i to denote its ith coordinate component. For two vectors x and y, we use x < y (x ≤ y) to denote x i < y i (x i ≤ y i ) for all coordinate indices i. We let x T denote the transpose of a vector x, and x n denote its n-norm. For a matrix A, we use a ij or [A] ij to denote its ijth entry. We use |a ij | to denote the absolute value of scalar a ij . Given two sets U and S, we write U ⊂ S to denote that U is a proper subset of S. We use |S| for the cardinality of a given finite set S. Let Φ be a closed and convex set in R m , we use P (y) to denote the projection of any point y ∈ R m onto Φ (closest point to y in Φ). We also denote by ∂Φ the boundary of Φ and n y the outward normal for any y ∈ ∂Φ. We use dist(y, Φ) to denote the euclidean distance between point y and set Φ. Given a set N of players and a function η : S → R defined for each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N, we write < N, η > to denote the transferable utility (TU) game with the players' set N and the characteristic function η. We let η S be the value η(S) of the characteristic function η associated with a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N. Given a TU game < N, η >, we use C(η) to denote the core of the game, C(η) = April 24, 2012 DRAFT
x ∈ R |N | i∈N x i = η N , i∈S x i ≥ η S for all nonempty S ⊂ N . Also, R + denotes the set of nonnegative real numbers. Given a random vector ξ the notation E[ξ] denotes its expected value. Given a random process {v(t)} we denote byṽ(t) = t 0 v(τ )dτ , its integral andv(t) =ṽ (t) t its average up to time t.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the problem in its generic form and elaborate on the role of information. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players and S ⊆ N the set of all (nonempty) coalitions arising among these players. Denote by m = 2 n − 1 the number of possible coalitions. We assume that time is continuous and use t ∈ R + to index the time slots.
We consider a dynamic TU game, denoted < N, {v(t)} >, where {v(t)} is a continuous flow of characteristic functions. The flow {v(t)} describes a bounded mean ergodic process.
By bounded we mean that given a bounded convex set V ∈ R m and a probability function P ∈ ∆(V), where ∆(V) is the set of probability functions on V, then for all t ∈ R + each random variable v(t) takes values in V ∈ R m according to probability P as expressed in (1);
by mean ergodic we mean that its expected value coincides with the long term average as in (2) :
Thus, in the dynamic TU game < N, {v(t)} >, the players are involved in a sequence of instantaneous TU games whereby, at each time t, the instantaneous TU game is < N, v(t) > with v(t) ∈ V for all t ≥ 0. Further, we let v S (t) denote the value assigned to a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N in the instantaneous game < N, v(t) >.
With the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game < N, {v(t)} > and an instantaneous average game at time t ≥ 0, < N,v(t) >.
The motivation of formalizing the above dynamic TU games is in that such games represent a stylized model of all those scenarios where the coalitions' values vary with time.
We assume that the core of the average game is nonempty on the long run. We will see that without this assumption the problem under study has no solution. Thus, denote by v nom the (long run) average coalitions' values, namely, v nom := lim t→∞v (t) and let C(v nom ) be the core of the average game.
Assumption 1: (balancedness)
The core of the average game is nonempty in the limit:
We can view the above assumption as introducing some steady-state (average) conditions on a game scenario subject to instantaneous fluctuations. However, note that we do not make assumptions regarding the balancedness of the instantaneous games which is the case with [7] . Thus, the core of the instantaneous game can be empty at some time t.
Given the above dynamic TU game, a central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the instantaneous allocations denoted by a(t) ∈ R n . We assume that the allocations are subject to the following budget constraints.
Assumption 2: (bounded allocation)
The instantaneous allocation is bounded within a
with a priori given lower and upper bounds a min , a max ∈ R n .
As regards the information available a priori (before the game starts) to the central planner,
we assume that he knows the nature of the process {v(t))} (bounded mean ergodic), the bounded set V and the long run average coalitions' values v nom . The latter is the same as saying that he knows the expected coalitions' values for all t ∈ R + . On the other hand, he has no knowledge of the underlying probability function P.
Assumption 3: (on available information)
The planner knows v nom .
Beside this, during the game the central planner also observes the extra reward of the coalitions up to t and for all t ∈ R + . Given this, and in line with a number of other papers [2] , [12] , [15] , [18] , [22] , our goal is to find allocation rules that use a measure of the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time by re-distributing the budget among the players. To do this, a first step is to define excesses for the coalitions. For any coalition S ⊆ N, we define excess (extra reward) at time t ≥ 0 as the excess at time t = 0 plus the difference between the total integral reward, given to it, and the integral value of the coalition itself, i.e.,
Furthermore, assuming without loss of generality ǫ S (0) = 0, we say that S is in excess at time t ≥ 0 if the excess is nonnegative, i.e., i∈Sã i (t) ≥ṽ S (t). Let ǫ(t) represent the vector April 24, 2012 DRAFT of coalitions' excesses, formally given as:
We are interested in answering two main questions for this class of games.
• Question 1: Are there allocation rules such that the average allocations converge? If yes, let us denote by A 0 the set where the average allocations converge to. Can we make it converge to the core of the average game A 0 ⊆ C(v nom )? Can we guarantee the convergence to a specific point of the core, call it nominal allocation a nom , that we have a priori selected?
• Question 2: Are there allocation rules such that the coalitions' excesses ǫ(t) converge to an a priori given cone Σ 0 , say for instance the nonnegative m-dimensional orthant We are now in the position of providing a formal and generic statement of the problem.
Henceforth, we use the symbol w.p.1 to mean "with probability one".
Problem 2.1: Find an allocation rule
Observe that because of the random nature of the coalitions' values v(t), both the excesses ǫ(t) and the allocations a(t) are random and as such we look at the convergence ofā(t) w.p.1.
Essentially, we require that the probability ofā(t) converging in the limit to A 0 ⊆ C(v nom ) is 1. Similarly for ǫ(t) and Σ 0 . This type of convergence is also known as almost sure convergence [20] .
We will show that if the planner has full observation of ǫ(t) at every time t then the above of not reordering is the cost of the unfulfilled demand d i (t).
(a) Five trucks (cycles) leaving v0 and serving coalitions {v1, . . . , v4}, {v5, . . . , v7}, {v8}, {v9}, and {v10} respectively.
(b) One single truck (cycle) leaving v0 and serving coalition {v1, . . . , v10}.
Fig. 1. Example of a distribution network
If two or more retailers "play" in a coalition, they agree on a joint decision ("everyone reorders" or "no one reorders"). The cost of reordering for the coalition also equals the total transportation cost that must be shared among the retailers. In this case, when necessary a single truck will serve all retailers in the coalition and get back to the warehouse. This is illustrated, with reference to coalition {v 1 , . . . , v 4 } by the dashed cycle How the players will share the cost is a part of the solution generated by the bargaining process.
Conversely, the subgraph induced by {v 1 , . . . , v 10 } in Figure 1 The cost scheme can be captured by a game with the set N = {v 1 , . . . , v n } of players where the cost of a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N is given by
Note that the bounds on the demand d i (t) reflect into the bounds on the cost as follows: for all nonempty S ⊆ N and t ≥ 0,
To complete the derivation of the coalitions' values we need to compute the cost savings v S (t) of a coalition S as the difference between the sum of the costs of the coalitions of the individual players in S and the cost of the coalition itself, namely,
Given the bound for c S (t) in (3), the value v S (t) is also bounded, as given: for any S ⊂ N and t ≥ 0,
Thus, the cost savings (value) of each coalition is bounded uniformly by a maximum value.
Introducing time aspects into a static TU game opens the possibility for modeling aspects such as intertemporal transfers, patience and expectations of players/coalitions. A generic April 24, 2012 DRAFT dynamic coalitional game description should capture these features. In a repeated joint replenishment game as the one discussed above, allocation rules having the properties formalized in Problem 2.1, encourage patient retailers to "play" in the grand coalition, to coordinate their replenishment policies and therefore to reduce total transportation costs. We say patient retailers since condition i) in Problem 2.1 guarantees convergence to core on the long-run,
i.e., in an average sense. Condition ii) has the meaning of bounding the excesses during the transient (before convergence occurs).
III. FLOW TRANSFORMATION BASED DYNAMICS
The basic idea of our solution approach is to recast the problem into a flow control one.
To do this, consider the hyper-graph H with vertex set V and edge set E as: generic edge i is incident to a vertex v j if the player i is in the coalition associated to v j .
So, incidence relations are described by matrix B H whose rows are the characteristic vectors c S ∈ R n . We recall that the components of a characteristic vector c 
with the last inequality satisfied with the equal sign due to the efficiency condition of the core, i.e, i=1 a i (t) = v m (t), where v m (t) denotes the mth component of v(t) and is equal to the grand coalition value v N (t). Now, since v(t) is unobservable by the planner at time t, we need to introduce some allocation error dynamics which accounts for the derivatives of the excesses. Since ǫ(t) represents the coalition excess, we have:
Note that the above differential equation admits a solution at least in the sense of Filippov [14] . From (4) and by averaging and taking the limit in (5) This increases the dimension of the control space of the planner from m to n + m − 1 and the dynamics (5) can be rewritten as follows:
where
represents the state of the system and captures deviation from the balanced system, i.e., the system characterized by a nom and v nom . We introduce the set of feasible controls as:
Toward the reformulation of the problem as a stochastic stabilizability one, we introduce the following preliminary result.
Lemma 3.1:
If the variable x(t) is asymptotically stable almost surely, i.e., (8) holds true, then the average allocations converge to the core of the average game w.p.1. as expressed by (9) , and the excesses converge to the cone R m + w.p.1. as described in (10):
Proof: To see why (8) implies (9), observe that if lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1. then lim t→∞ x(t)−x(0) t = 0 w.p.1. and therefore, by integrating and dividing by t in (6) also lim t→∞ Bū(t) −v(t) = 0 w.p.1. The latter can be rewritten as lim t→∞ Bū(t) = v nom w.p.1, and as from (7)s(t) = B Hā (t)−v(t) ≥ 0 and v nom is balanced by Assumption 2 then we conclude that lim t→∞ā (t) ∈ C(v nom ) w.p.1.
To see why (8) implies (10), observe that if lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1., from (7) and under the assumption x(0) = ǫ(0) = 0, then lim t→∞ ǫ(t) = lim t→∞s (t) ≥ 0 and (10) is proved. and ii). More specifically, case ii) where A 0 = C(v nom ) can be restated as follows:
Find u(t) := φ(x(t)) ∈ U such that lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1.
Note that if we wish to reach a specific point a nom then the condition (9) is only necessary and the resulting problem is a stricter version of (11).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we present the three main results of this work. The first one relates to the case where the planner has full observation on x(t) in which case the average allocation can be driven to a specific point in the Core of the average game. The second result applies to the case where the planner has partial observation on x(t), and convergence to the Core can still be guaranteed but not to a specific point of the Core. The third result highlights connections of the implemented solution approach to the approachability principle [9] , [18] and attainability principle [4] , [19] .
A. Full information case
In this section, we solve Problem 2.1 with A 0 = a nom and Σ 0 = αt, t ≥ 0 with fixed α under the assumption that the planner has full observation of the excesses ǫ(t) and therefore x(t) as well. We recall that inferring x(t) from ǫ(t) is possible as the surplus s(t) is selected by the planner. As we have said before, the problem that we solve is a stricter version of (11).
This version derives from augmenting the state of dynamics (6) as explained in the rest of this section. Before introducing the augmentation technique let us assume that the fluctuations of the coalitions' values around the mean v nom are independent of the state x(t). We formalize this in the next assumption where we denote by ∆v(t) = v(t) − v nom the above fluctuations.
Assumption 4:
The state x(t) and the coalitions' values fluctuations ∆v(t) are independent.
Introducing the fluctuations ∆v(t) allows us to rewrite dynamics (6) T are fixed. Let us denote ∆u(t) = u(t) − u nom . Dynamics (6) can be rewritten as follows:
We mentioned before that we will focus on a stricter version of (11). We do this by augmenting the state as shown next. First, denote by B † a generic pseudo inverse matrix of B and complete matrices B and B † with matrices C and F such that
Then, building upon the new square matrix
 , let us consider the augmented systeṁ
Here we assume that v(t) is independent of y(t) as well. After integrating the above system (see (14) , right) we define a new variable z(t) as follows:
It turns out that to drive x(t) to zero w.p.1, and obtain u nom as average allocation on the long run, we can rely on a simple functionφ(.), which depends on z(t). Before introducing this function, for future purposes observe that the dynamics for z(t) satisfies the first-order differential equation:
Let ∆u min and ∆u max be the minimal and maximal values of ∆u(t) for the following constraints to hold true: u(t) = u nom + ∆u(t) ∈ U. Then, let us formally defineφ(z(t))
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where with sat [a,b] (ξ) we denote the saturated function that, given a generic vector ξ and lower and upper bounds a and b of same dimensions as ξ, returns
Now, taking the control u(t) =φ(z(t)), we obtain the dynamic systemż(t) = Bφ(z(t))−v(t)
as displayed in Fig. 4 . With the above preamble in mind, we are ready to state the following convergence property.
Theorem 4.1:
Using the controllerφ(z(t)), as in (16), we have lim t→∞ z(t) = 0 w.p.1 and therefore lim t→∞ū (t) = u nom .
In the next corollary, we use the previous result to provide an answer to Problem 2.1.
Corollary 4.1:
The state x(t) is driven to zero w.p.1 as expressed in (11), the average allocation converges to the nominal allocation i.e., lim t→∞ā (t) = a nom , w.p.1 and the excesses converge to the direction Σ 0 = αt with α = s nom , i.e., lim t→∞ ǫ(t) ∈ Σ 0 .
Proof: This is a direct consequence of the result proved in the previous theorem. From (14) , and [B † F ] being a non singular matrix, we have lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1. From the previous theorem we also have lim t→∞ū (t) = u nom . Since
T , we have that lim t→∞ā (t) = a nom and lim t→∞ ǫ(t) =s(t) = s nom t.
To summarize, in the full information case, the controller u(t) defined by (16) induces an allocation sequence a(t) such that the averageā(t) converges to A 0 = a nom and the excesses approach s nom t.
B. Partial information case
In the previous section we observed that if the planner has full observation of the excesses and therefore of x(t) then he can design an allocation rule so that the average allocations are driven to a nom and the excesses approach s nom t. In this section, we solve Problem 2.1 with A 0 = C(v nom ) and under the assumption that the planner has partial observation of x(t). In particular, we assume that the planner observes the sign of x(t) for all t ∈ R + . An information structure based on the sign of x(t) has an oracle-based interpretation which we discuss in detail in Subsection IV-B1.
Similarly to the previous section, suppose that we know a particular allocation a nom in the core C(v nom ), and let us study the convergence properties of the average allocations.
In particular, using an allocation rule u(t) = φ(x(t)), we require that x(t) satisfying the dynamicsẋ(t) = Bφ(x(t)) − v(t), converge to zero in probability. In this section, we state the second main result of this work which provides a solution to Problem 2.1 with partial information structure. To do this, let us denote again by B † a generic pseudo inverse matrix of B and take a feasible allocation u nom such that
Also, for future purposes, define a functionφ(.), which depends only on the sign of x(t), as follows:φ (sgn(x(t))) := u nom + ∆u(t) ∈ U, ∆u(t) = −δB † sgn(x(t)).
Now, taking the control u(t) =φ(sgn(x(t))), we obtain the dynamic systemẋ(t) = Bφ(sgn(x(t)))− v(t) as displayed in Fig. 5 . Now, we state the following convergence property.
Theorem 4.2:
Using the controller u(t) =φ(sgn(x(t))) as in (17) we have lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1.
Corollary 4.2:
The average allocation converges to the core of the average game as in (9) and the excesses ǫ(t) converge to R m + as in (10).
sgn(x(t))
Fig. 5. Dynamical System
Proof: Direct consequence of Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 3.1.
1) Oracle-based interpretation:
In this subsection we elaborate more on the partial information structure. In particular, we highlight how the feedback on state x(t) can be reviewed as the result of an oracle-based procedure. To see this, assume that the planner knows the sign of x(t). Since x(t) = (ǫ(t) −s(t)) − (ǫ(0) − x(0)), sgn(x(t)) reflects over-satisfaction of coalitions with respect to the thresholds(t). In particular, take without loss of generality ǫ(0), x(0) = 0, then with reference to component j, the sign of x j (t) yields:
To summarize, we can think of a situation where the planner approaches an oracle that tells him the sign of x(t). Since s(t) is chosen by the planner for every t, the accumulated surplus, s(t), is given as an input to the oracle. The oracle returns "yes" if the actual excess is greater thans(t) and "no" otherwise. The use of an oracle is an element in common with the ellipsoid method in optimization and with a large literature [26] on cutting planes.
Recall that nonnegativeness of the threshold has its roots in the feasibility condition u(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0 with feasible set U as in (7).
Nonnegativeness of the threshold provides us with a further comment on the information available to the planner. Actually, from the first condition in (18), we can conclude that coalitions associated to a positive state x(t) are certainly in excess. This is clear if we observe that sgn (x j (t)) = 1 implies ǫ j (t) >s j (t) ≥ 0. We can then summarize the information content available to the planner as follows, where S is the generic coalition associated with component j:
Trivially, the development in the full information case in Section IV-A, which is all based on control strategy (16) , fits the case where x(t) is revealed completely. In this last case, the fact that the planner knows x(t) implies that he knows ǫ(t) as well. Also, it is intuitive to infer that in this last set up, exact knowledge of x(t) can only influence positively the planner in terms of speed of convergence of allocations to the core of the average game.
Remark 4.1:
As the planner knows a priori the nominal game and a corresponding nominal allocation vector, a natural question that arises is why one has to design an allocation rule as given by (16) and (17) instead of a stationary ruleφ(.) = u nom . The rules given by (16) and (17) intuitively translate to meeting the demands of coalitions in an average sense. This feature reflects patience aspect of coalitions in a dynamic setting, i.e., even if a demand is not met instantaneously a coalition is willing to wait and stay in the grand coalition as the demand is fulfilled in an average sense. The goal of this section is to show that such a geometric principle shares striking similarities with the solution approach used in the previous sections.
C. Connections to Approachability and
To introduce the approachability principle, let Φ be a closed and convex set in R m and let P (y) be the projection of any point y ∈ R m (closest point to y in Φ). Also denote byȳ k the average of y 1 . . . , y k , i.e.,ȳ k = k t=0 yt k and let dist(ȳ k , Φ) be the euclidean distance between pointȳ k and set Φ.
Lemma 4.1: (Approachability principle [18] ) Suppose that a sequence of uniformly bounded vectors y k in R m satisfies condition (19) ,
then lim k→∞ dist(ȳ k , Φ) = 0.
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and define a new variable y k = x k − x k−1 so that we can look at the sequence of y k in R m .
Likewise, consider the discrete time version of control (17) as displayed below:
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.3:
Using the controller u k =φ(sgn(x k − x 0 )) as in (20) we have that i) the vector 0 is approachable by the sequenceȳ k ,
and therefore ii) the average allocations converge to the core of the average game,
The strength of the above result is in that it sheds light on how the convergence problem dealt with in this work has a stochastic stability interpretation as well as an approachability one.
Remark 4.2:
(Continuous-time approachability) We can reformulate Theorem 4.3 in the continuous time. To see this, let us first define y(t) :=ẋ(t). Next we need to derive the continuous time version of (19) . To this aim, let t → r(t) be a differentiable continuous time variable and let z(t) = r(t)−r(0) t , so tż(t) + z(t) =ṙ(t). Discrete time versions are given as
r k+1 . The approachability principle is given as
where φ = (k + 1)z k+1 − kz k . In continuous time the above condition translates to
and φ = (t + ∆t)z(t + ∆t) − tz(t) = t (z(t + ∆t) − z(t)) + ∆tz(t + ∆t). We see that
The approachability principle in continuous time can then be reproposed as
which constitutes the continuous time version of (19) . If Φ = {0} we have P (z(t)) = 0 and z T (t)ṙ(t) ≤ 0. Now, taking r(t) = x(t) we see that z(t) is the average of y(t). Then condition (23) guarantees that z(t) converges to zero as well asȳ(t). But this implies that lim t→∞ x(t)−x(0) t = 0 and therefore from Lemma 3.1 we arrive at (9) which represents the continuous time version of (22) .
2) Attainability: Attainability is a new notion developed in [4] , [19] Attainability shares similarities with two main notions in robust control theory [10] . The first notion is called robust global attractiveness and refers to the property of a set to "attract" the state of the system under a proper control strategy and independently of the effects of the disturbance. The second notion is referred to as robustly controlled invariance and describes the property of a set to bound the state trajectory under a proper control strategy and independently of the effects of the disturbance. Both notions are used in the following formalization of the attainability principle. The principle is accompanied by a sketch of the proof but no formal proof is reported as attainability is the main focus of another paper and here it is just auxiliary to the solution of our main problem and also because the aforementioned two notions are well known in robust control theory. We refer the readers to [10] and [4] , [19] for further details.
Let Φ be a closed and convex set in R m and consider a differentiable continuous-time variable t → y(t) taking value in R m for all t ≥ 0.
Lemma 4.2:
(Attainability principle [4] , [19] ) Suppose that the differentiable continuoustime variable t → y(t) satisfies conditions (24)- (25),
then lim t→∞ dist(y(t), Φ) = 0.
Essentially, condition (25) is strictly related to the subtangentiality conditions as formulated by Nagumo in 1942 and surveyed in [10] . Such conditions are proven to characterize robustly controlled invariant sets. We provide a geometric perspective on such a condition in Fig. 7(b) .
Consider a 2 player continuous-time repeated game and let y(t) be the cumulative payoff up to time t. Denote by Y the set of possible instantaneous vector payoffs, call themẏ(t), for a fixed strategy of player 1 and for varying strategy of player 2. Condition (25) is equivalent to Y ⊂ H − := {y ∈ R m | n y(t)ẏ (t) ≤ 0} and guarantees that the cumulative payoff up to time t + dt (dt is the infinitesimal time interval) y(t + dt) does not quit Φ.
As regards condition (24), suppose without loss of generality that Φ := {x ∈ R m | V (x) ≤ κ} for a fixed scalar κ. Condition (24) establishes that the set Φ = {x ∈ R m | V (x) ≤κ} for any scalarκ satisfyingκ > κ is a contractive set. By contractive set we mean that it is invariant and, whenever the state is on the boundary, the control can "push it towards the interior". This is illustrated in Fig. 7(a) . Let Y and y(t) have the same meaning as before.
implies that dist(y(t + dt), Φ) < dist(y(t), Φ) and therefore Φ is robustly attractive. (24) and (25) .
Based on the above lemma, we can rephrase Theorem 4.2 as follows.
Theorem 4.4:
Using the controller u(t) =φ(sgn(x(t))) as in (17) we have that the vector 0 is attainable by x(t).
V. DERIVATION OF THE MAIN RESULTS

A. Proof of Theorem 4.1
This proof is derived in the context of Lyapunov stochastic stability theory [20] . We start by observing that using u(t) =φ(z(t)) we have:
D. Proof of Theorem 4.4
Let us invoke the attainability principle in Lemma 4.2 and observe that a sufficient condition for x(t) to attain 0 w.p.1 is that
This is evident if we take set Φ including only the zero vector, Φ = {0}, and thus P (x(t)) = 0
in (24) and (25) . Now, observe that condition (27) 
The convex set V is then a hyperbox characterized by the above intervals. From Assumption 3, the planner knows the long run average game, i.e., lim t→∞v (t) = v nom . Without loss of generality we take the balanced nominal game be as v nom = [1 2 3 4 5 6 10] T . In other words, during the simulations we randomize the instantaneous games v(t) ∈ V so that it satisfies the average behavior given by:
Next, we describe an algorithm to generate P ∈ ∆(V) and therefore v(t) ∈ V such that the above condition holds true.
By construction, v nom is in the relative interior of the convex hull generated by the columns of the matrix R. If an instance of the game v(t) is chosen as r i with probability p i from the pair (R, p), Assumption 3 is satisfied. For simulations we ran the algorithm 10 times to generate 10 (R, p) pairs in V. Further, from each pair (R, p) we take 100, 000 random selections (using T . It can be verified that Bu nom = v nom .
Full information case:
The saturation thresholds ∆u min and ∆u max are chosen so as to ensure u(t) ∈ U. This condition translates into
Denote 1 as a vector with all entries equal to 1. For the instantaneous game a negative allocation/surplus is not allowed, so U min ≥ 0 · 1. Further, an allocation/surplus greater than the value of grand coalition is not allowed, so translates to U min ≤ u nom + δB † sgn(x) ≤ U max . We observe
A conservative estimate of δ is obtained as U min ≤ u nom ± δ max i { j |B † ij |} ≤ U max . For m = 7, we have max i { j |B † ij |} = 2.11. For the instantaneous game a negative allocation/surplus is not allowed, so U min ≥ 0.1. Furthermore, an allocation/surplus greater than the value of grand coalition is not allowed, so U max ≤ v nom (N).1. We chose δ = 1, which satisfies the above stated requirements. Next, we present performance results of the (17) . April 24, 2012 DRAFT robust control law given by equation (17) . From Theorem 4.2, x(t) converges to zero in probability with a specific choice of control law and as a result lim t→∞ x(t)−x(0) t converges to zero. Fig. 8 (a) illustrates this behavior for the first component of coalition {1, 2}. Further, by Corollary 4.2, the same control law ensures that the average allocations converge to the core C(v nom ) and from equation (17) it is clear that the instantaneous allocations lie in a neighborhood of nominal allocations. As a result there is uncertainty in the convergence of average allocations towards nominal allocations on the long run and Fig. 8(b) illustrates this behavior.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we studied dynamic cooperative games where at each instant of time the value of each coalition of players is unknown but varies within a bounded polyhedron.
With the assumption that the average value of each coalition in the long run is known with certainty, we presented robust allocations schemes, which converge to the core, under two informational settings. We proved the convergence of both allocation rules using Lyapunov stochastic stability theory. Furthermore, we established connections of Lyapunov stability theory to concepts of approachability and attainability. The control laws or allocation schemes are derived on the premise that the GD knows a priori, the nominal allocation vector. If this information is not available then the problem can be treated as a learning process where the GD is trying to learn the (balanced) nominal game from the instantaneous games. The allocation rules designed in this paper assure stability of the coalitions in average, and as a result capture patience and expectations of the players in an integral sense. The modeling aspects of generic dynamic coalitional games are open questions at this point of time.
